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Abstract—Network covert channels break a computer’s se-
curity policy to establish a stealthy communication. They are
a threat being increasingly used by malicious software. Most
previous studies on detecting network covert channels using Ma-
chine Learning (ML) were tested with a dataset that was created
using one single covert channel tool and also are ineffective at
classifying covert channels into patterns. In this paper, selected
ML methods are applied to detect popular network covert chan-
nels. The capacity of detecting and classifying covert channels
with high precision is demonstrated. A dataset was created from
nine standard covert channel tools and the covert channels are
then accordingly classified into patterns and labelled. Half of the
generated dataset is used to train three different ML algorithms.
The remaining half is used to verify the algorithms’ performance.
The tested ML algorithms are Support Vector Machines (SVM),
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) and Deep Neural Networks (DNN).
The k-NN model demonstrated the highest precision rate at 98%
detection of a given covert channel and with a low false positive
rate of 1%.
Index Terms—Network steganography, Information hiding,
Active warden, Data leakage protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although most organizations and critical infrastructures
[57] enforce their network perimeter defense by means of
common security controls such as firewall or anti-malware
tools, cyber attacks and particularly data breaches [3] continue
to increase. In these situations, where information is either
infiltrated or exfiltrated using techniques that are not supposed
to be authorized by computer policy, security controls can
become ineffective.
In computer security, these techniques are called covert
channels [9]. They are considered as threats and defined
as communication channel[s] that can be exploited by a
process to transfer information in a manner that violates
system security policy [5], [21]. Covert channels can be used
maliciously to transfer data from one subject to another [15]
and are commonly classified into storage, timing and hybrid
channels [56]. Storage covert channels use a storage carrier
to encode covert data [21]. Timing covert channels employ
modulation on the shared resources by the sender, which
impacts the response time observed by the receiver. Hybrid
channels on the other hand refer to covert channels that use
both timing and storage. Because our focus is on storage covert
channels, this paper will not further discuss the other two.
Scrubbers, normalizers and wardens are used to defend a
network from storage covert channels. Scrubbers and normal-
izers eliminate any ambiguities identified in the traffic [46].
The detection of a Network Covert Channel (NCC) is the
primary objective of the warden. A warden is a single node in
a network that intends to unveil, limit or eliminate any hidden
communication [43]. To achieve these objectives, this warden
network typically employs one of four types of approaches:
passive, active, proactive or reactive [56], [44]. The passive
approach relies on the monitoring of network traffic, yet the
active approach influences the traffic through many ways to
delete ambiguous data from TCP/IP [7] header fields. The
proactive approach deliberately add crafted covert packets
to figure whether any hidden communication is occurring.
When the warden takes an action by only targeting covert
communication, it is called reactive.
The fundamental deficiencies on the existent wardens are
two. Firstly, the need of human intervention to insert rules
that are capable of identifying ambiguities on the network
traffic. Secondly, the warden is limited in the sense that it
can only detect threats that are already known. A Network
Anomaly Detection System (NADS) circumvents the men-
tioned deficiencies by encountering unusual patterns in the net-
work traffic that are non-compliant with expected normal be-
havior. NADS can be statistically-based, classification-based,
clustering-based or information theory-based. Currently, the
anomalies can fall into three groups: collective, contextual and
point. Point anomalies refer to any deviation of particular data
from a normal pattern of a dataset. When anomalies occur in
a particular context, they are designated as a contextual group.
Collective anomalies are the correlation of similar anomalies
within an entire dataset [54], [36]. The main limitations of
NADS are:
1) The inherent need to define the notion of the traffic’s
“normality”. Actually, an object is considered as anoma-
lous if its rate of deviation within the defined profile of
normal is adequately high.
2) NADS usually requires human intervention for analyz-
ing, interpreting and acting on the generated alert by the
infected systems.
3) The variation detection of network traffic with known
anomalies by NADS has not been dealt with in depth.
Indeed, one of the most powerful and cheapest tactics
for a cyber-attacker to evade security countermeasure is
to develop new variants from existing covert channel
techniques.
The related academic literature on detecting NCC with ML has
mainly two limitations. Firstly, the proposed detection schemes
were largely tested on very limited covert channel techniques.
Secondly, little attention has been given on classifying covert
channels into patterns.
The primary contributions of this paper are: (1) analyzing
eleven popular NCC tools and classifying them accordingly
into patterns [28]; (2) designing a proof of concept for the
detection and classification of NCCs using three different
ML algorithms; (3) comparative evaluation of the used ML
algorithms; and (4) identification and discussion of the results
and indicating possible future research directions.
We present our analysis of related work in Section II.
In subsequent sections (Sections III-IV), we describe the
detection scheme and discuss the experimental measurements.
Our findings are discussed in Section V and conclusion in
Section VI.
II. FUNDAMENTALS & RELATED WORK
The traditional approach on detecting NCCs (i.e. signature-
based, behavior-based, heuristic-based) relies on the manual
definition of signatures. This approach often fails to detect
novel threats. To circumvent this problem ML is widely used
[14], which is capable of modelling the normal behaviour of
a network traffic and consequently can detect any unexpected
behavior within the network traffic without (or with minor)
human intervention. ML aims at making computer systems
adapt their actions so that these actions get more accurate
[58] ML techniques are generally grouped into two categories:
supervised and unsupervised. The supervised category learns
from a set of labelled data and encodes that learning into a
model to predict an attribute for new data. On the other hand,
unsupervised ML is used to find patterns within data that are
without a specified target variable [24]. Supervised ML, which
is also called classification, is characterized by the use of a
labelled dataset. Classification is defined by the creation of a
model by the training the labelled dataset. The created model
is then used to predict the label of a certain dataset with an
unknown label. We distinguish three families of datasetss as
follows [1]:
1) Synthetic: Created to fulfill special requirements in re-
lation with real data circumstances.
2) Benchmark: Generated on a simulated environment
along with network devices.
3) Real life: Prepared by collecting network traffic during
a certain period of time.
The identification and detection of covert channels are
distinct. The identification aims to determine a shared resource
that could be utilized as covert carrier. However, the detection
examines the event flow in order to reveal a covert channel in
operation. To minimize any negative impact on performance,
the detection mechanism should be implemented before the
elimination one. There are mainly three strategies to detect
network covert channels: signature-based, anomaly-based and
specification-based [19]. The signature-based detection requi-
sites the creation of a baseline of signatures that need regular
maintenance and update (signatures are typically patterns that
a warden should monitor). This type of detection is typically
the pattern that a warden should monitor to detect covert
channels. The anomaly-based detection approach identifies any
deviation from the normal traffic. Lastly, the specification-
based approach intends to match the predefined specifications
of a protocol to verify any misuse or attacks. The capabilities
of the listed detection approaches are limited to the known
NCCs. These limitations could be circumvented by the use
of ML, which is referred to as the studies of automatic
techniques for learning to make accurate predictions based on
past observations [45].
There are three types of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
using ML: single, hybrid and ensemble. When an IDS uses an
individual ML algorithm it is called single, hybrid IDS uses
several algorithms. However, ensemble IDS refers employs a
combination of several weak ML algorithms [27].
Various ML algorithms have been proposed in covert chan-
nels related literature. For instance, Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) was used to detect covert communication on the TCP
stack [30]. The main pitfall of it though is the limitation of the
algorithm on detecting covert communication in applications
that use tunneling. Gilbert and Bhattacharya [50] suggested
a twofold detection system that features both covert channel
profiling and anomaly detection. The genetic algorithm was
used in the IDS first in 1995 by applying a hybrid approach
of multiple agents and genetic programming in order to detect
anomalies [13], [33]. Some enhanced ML techniques include
the Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA) based on Naive
Bayes classifiers to detect covert in IPv6 [41]. Salih et al.
[22] improved the detection rate and reached an accuracy of
94% by using enhanced decision trees C4.5 with a very low
false negative rate. C4.5 was also applied to detect protocol
switching covert channels (PSCC) in [55]. The main incon-
venience of the supervised method is that it requires labelled
information for efficient learning. Additionally, it can hardly
deal with the relationship between consecutive variations of
learning inputs without additional prepossessing.
There is a considerable number of works that have used
Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify network anomalies
[24], [16], [2], [4], [10], [11], [12], [20], [23], [35]. Compared
with other ML algorithms, SVM has faster processing and
is capable of processing both supervised and unsupervised
learning [26], [17], [6]. For instance, SVM was used in a
passive warden to detect TCP anomalies within TCP ISN
and IP ID [25] or IPv4 network anomaly detection [29], [8].
SVM could be used to classify patterns based on statistical
learning techniques for the regression and the categorization
[23], [4]. This algorithm aims to achieve the optimal separating
hyperplane in a higher dimensional feature space by using a
kernel function.
On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that k-NN is
one of the simplest ML algorithms [31]. Firstly, it classifies the
entire dataset into training and testing data points. Secondly,
it evaluates the distance from all training points to the testing
points. The point that has the lowest distance is named nearest
neighbor. Tsai et al. [34] suggested a hybrid method based on
a triangle area using the k-NNs approach to detect attacks.
suggested a hybrid method based on a triangle area using the
k-NNs approach to detect attacks. They extract the number
of center clusters where each cluster center constitutes one
specific type of attack. Then, the triangle area is calculated
by two clusters chosen randomly and one data point from the
dataset. Finally, the constituted triangle symbolizes one new
feature for measuring similar attacks. This k-NN classifier is
used based on the feature of triangle areas to detect intrusions.
Most studies on the detection of storage covert channels were
tested with a single popular tool (e.g. Covert-TCP), [47], [48],
[51], [49] [42], [52], [53] with captured traffic [45], [46], [44],
[48] or with a personalized developed tool for the purpose
of research work [47]. The authors of this paper propose a
detection concept that uses ML with 3 different algorithms,
which are not based on own particular developed techniques
but on popular tools instead.
III. DETECTION APPROACH
The proposed approach is based on three steps: (1) gener-
ating the datasetss containing network traffic, (2) training and
feature extraction, and (3) testing the models with different
tools.
A. Generating the datasets
In order to train the ML algorithms, datasets were created
of a mixture of real life and benchmark network packets [1]
(ge umhnerated in a lab environment). For the benchmark
dataset we have collected a set of tools as listed on Tab. II and
covert traffic was produced. Then, PCAP files were labelled
according to the type of pattern the covert packets belonged
to.
Wendzel et al. introduced a pattern-based classification of
covert channels. 109 covert channels were categorized into 11
distinct patterns based on their similarities [28]. For example,
the pattern P7 represents covert channels that encode data
into a reserved or unused field. To train the ML models,
large labelled datasets (supervised) that represent each type
of pattern were used. As shown in Tab. I, this research work
focuses only on the following patterns:
TABLE I
LIST OF PATTERNS
Pattern Tittle Description
P0 Normal packet Non covert
P1 Size modulation The covert channel uses the size of
a header element or of a PDU to
encode the hidden message.
P5 Random Value The covert channel embeds hidden
data in a header element containing
a random value.
P7 Reserved/Unused The covert channel encoded hid-
den data into a reserved or unused
heaer/PDU element.
NP0157 Non-P0-P1-P5-
P7
Different patterns from the above
Labels are saved in a CSV file, so that each packet of the
PCAP file is numbered and labelled accordingly.
TABLE II
CLASSIFICATION OF COVERT CHANNELS TOOLS
Tool Protocol Field Pattern
ishell ICMP Reserved P7
icmp-covert-channel ICMP
Echo reply P7
Echo request P7
Payload P7
dns2tcp DNS TXT records P7
dns-tunnel DNS Transaction id P7
sean
IP IP address P5
IP source port P5
IP TTL P5
TCP WIN P5
TCP TOS P5
TCP ACK NUM P5
spinfoo TCP SYN P5
iodine
DNS TXT P1
DNS SRV P1
DNS MX P1
DNS CNAME P1
DNS A records P1
tunnelshell
UDP
Many fields
P1
TCP P1
ICMP P1
IP P1
mawi.wide TCP/IP Many fields P0
Covert-tcp TCP Spaces in TCP NP0157
Jordan marling UDP src & dst port NP0157
B. Training and features extraction
As we use supervised ML, our training process requires a
pair of files (PCAP and CSV) and uses the Pcap2scikit class
from scikit-learn (Python ML library). Each time the model
is to be trained, the script checks the previous training model
and adds it to the new data. If there is no previous data, then
the model is newly created (Fig. 1). At the same time, features
are extracted from each packet.
Fig. 1. Detection process
The features are extracted when preprocessing the packet
data. For example, the TTL field can be preprocessed to
determine whether the packet is involved in TTL value modu-
lation. TTL values in packets sent by each sources address are
compared to previous TTL values in packets sent by the same
source. If the TTL value has changed, then the feature is the
percentage of packets that have previously had modified TTLs
out of the total packets sent from the same source address.
Both ML algorithms (k-NN and SVM) have a similar
training process. Therefore, they are stored in a file. The
cross-validation is executed using utility methods provided
by SKLEARN. For DNN we used TEENSORFLOW which
does not store models on a single file. Instead, a directory is
used to store several meta data and graph files. Since TEEN-
SORFLOW does not provide convenient methods for cross-
validation or predictions, we have created a method to make
these possible on both TEENSORFLOW and SKLEARN.
C. Testing
ML models are also called classifiers, and aim at learning
by corresponding the classes with the inputs [38]. Classifiers
are widely used to detect general network anomalies and also
covert channels. By generating knowledge based on using the
normal packets, the classifiers treat any activities that differ
from the normal packet attribute as covert. Therefore, novel
covert channel techniques can be detected with minimum
effort (as they also deviate from normal packets). Selecting
the appropriate classifier is a challenging task and generally
based on the accuracy of the prediction. In this paper only
supervised ML algorithms were used (k-NN, SVM and DNN)
for the following reasons:
• k-NN is characterized to be one of the most straightfor-
ward instance-based learning algorithms [32].
• SVM belongs to the newest supervised machine tech-
niques, it is pertinent with large number of features and
it is very useful in insolvency analysis (when data are
non regular) [37].
• DNN is capable of learning features automatically at any
level of abstraction by mapping the input and the output
directly from data with a negligible human-crafted feature
[39], [40].
The detection process requires a pair of (PCAP, CSV) files and
starts by first extracting the features from the packets similarly
to the training process. Secondly, it loads the model from a pkl
file. Thirdly, it calculates the accuracy. Lastly, it creates both
metrics and confusion matrix. An output file is then produced
which contains metrics values such as the number of packets
and the prediction rate (whether a packet is normal or covert),
as well as the classification of a certain covert packet into
covert channel patterns.
To train the ML models we used large labelled datasets
(supervised) that represent each type of pattern Tab.II. The
following 20 features are extracted from preprocessing the
packet data:
TABLE III
LIST OF FEATURES
Feature Description
TCP.RESERVED The reserved field of TCP
TCP.URGPTR The urgent pointer field of TCP
TCP.ACK TCP acknowledgment number
TCP.FLAGS The IP flags field
TCP.SPORT The source port for TCP
UDP.SPORT The source port of UDP
IP.TTL TTL field value of IP
IP.TOS TOS of IP
IP.SRC The IP source address
IP.ID IP ID field
IP.FLAGS IP flags field
IP.NUM.OPTS Number of IP options
ICMP.TYPE ICMP type number
ICMP.UNUSED Unused ICMP fields
ICMP.RS.RESERVED Reserved field of ICMP router solicitation
ICMP.SEQ The ICMP sequence field
IGMP.TYPE Type field of IGMP
IGMP.MRTIME The IGMP Max Resp Time field
IGMP.LOAD The IGMP Source Address field
IGMP.LOADLEN The length of IGMP payload
D. Metrics
The ML model is first evaluated using the 3-fold cross-
validation via the cross val score function in scikit-learns tool.
E. Model fitting and persistence
When the model is full with data, then it is stored to the
models directory. The scores from cross-validation and the
label encoder are also added. The original input PCAP and
CSV files are saved to the model’s directory. The model must
be saved to a disk to be reloaded and used for the testing
(prediction). The training data is saved to be combined with
additional training data in the future.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental setup
1) The dataset: The covert dataset was created us-
ing ten popular tools and the normal dataset from
http://mawi.wide.ad.jp. Afterwards, they were classified into
four patterns. Network packets were generated with each tool
and were systematically labelled as belonging to one of four
patterns as described in Tab. I. The global dataset is made
up of a consolidation of all packets created and labelled. The
distribution of normal and covert network packets (dataset)
for the classification of training and testing is summarized in
Tabs. IV.
TABLE IV
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE VALIDATION DATASET
Patterns Number of samples Sample percentage (%)
P7 28,969 10.6
P5 40,331 14.9
P1 47,603 17.6
P0 72,857 27.3
NP0157 80,092 29.6
270,579 100
2) Evaluation methodology: To measure the performance
of the NCC’s, the confusion matrix Tab. X, the accuracy, false
positive, detection and precision Tab. XI were calculated using
the following metrics:
• False Negative (FN): Incorrect negative classification.
• True Negative (TN): Correct negative classification.
• False Positive (FP): Incorrect positive classification.
• True Positive (TP): Correct positive classification.
B. Experimental results
1) SVM: The classification results of the NCC using SVM
with the degree 2 of the five patterns. The measurement
revealed a detection rate of 87%, an accuracy of 7%, an
average precision of 87% and false positive rate of 3%.
2) k-NN: After having tested many values of k, k=4 was
identified as being the best value. As shown in Tab. VI, the
rate of detection, accuracy, precision and false positive with
SVM are 89%, 90%, 96% and 1%, respectively.
3) DNN: The detection rate is high (92%) with a precision
of 85%, the accuracy rate is 67% and false positive 4%.
TABLE V
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS WITH TESTING NCC DATASET USING K-NN
Predicted
Normal Covert
Actual Normal 87,461 943Covert 283 60,705
TABLE VI
CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS BY TRAINING DATASET USING K-NN
Predicted
P0 P1 P5 P7 NP0157
Actual
P0 60,705 86 311 64 473
P1 47 14,434 0 1 14
P5 119 0 24,416 0 0
P7 10 0 0 16,882 5
NP0157 107 0 72 0 31,637
TABLE VII
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF THE MODELS BY TRAINING DATASETS
Accuracy Precision
P0 98% 99%
P1 99% 99%
P5 99% 98%
P7 99% 99%
NP0157 99% 98%
TABLE VIII
CONFUSION MATRIX RESULTS BY TESTING DATASET USING K-NN
Predicted
P0 P1 P5 P7 NP0157
Actual
P0 28,139 334 247 317 229
P1 536 32,489 0 7 73
P5 843 1519 9891 0 3543
P7 1579 0 0 10,220 0
NP0157 261 0 30 0 47985
TABLE IX
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BY TESTING DATASET USING K-NN
Accuracy False Positive Precision
P0 0.96 0.01 0.89
P1 0.98 0 0.95
P5 0.63 0.05 0.97
P7 0.87 0.01 0.97
NP0157 0.99 0 0.93
V. DISCUSSION
This section provides a comparison between the different
classifiers based on their metrics performance: accuracy, de-
tection rate, precision, TP, TN, FP and FN. This comparative
provides a basis of evaluation in order to identify the best ML
algorithm to detect NCC’s. Tab. X shows the performance of
the training dataset. k-NN performs the best given the highest
rates of detection, precision, accuracy, TP and lowest rates of
FN and FP. Tab. IV provides the detection capabilities for the
different patterns over the training dataset. The results reveal
that k-NN is capable of classifying NCC’s into patterns with
high accuracy and precision.
The measurement results of k-NN on testing dataset demon-
strates a difference on classification capabilities of the NCC
into patterns. (Tab. IX). While NP0157, P1 and P0 allowed
for the highest classification accuracy and precision rates, P5
and P7 resulted in the lowest values. On average, compared
with DNN and SVM, k-NN provides the best accuracy and
precision rates and lowest FP value. DNN has the highest
detection and FP rates.
TABLE X
COMPARISONS OF THE MODELS BY THE TRAINING DATASET
True Positive True Negative False Positive False Negative
SVM 55,568 84,356 6071 3388
k-NN 60,705 87,461 934 283
DNN 55.174 82.319 6465 5425
Detection Rate False Positive Accuracy Precision
SVM 94% 6% 94% 90%
k-NN 99% 1% 99% 98%
DNN 91% 0.07 98% 90%
TABLE XI
COMPARISON OF THE MODELS BY TESTING DATASETS
True Positive True Negative False Positive False Negative
SVM 25,534 105,893 3732 3085
k-NN 28,139 105,757 1127 3221
DNN 24,960 106,727 4306 2251
Detection Rate False Positive Accuracy Precision
SVM 89% 3% 7% 87%
k-NN 89% 1% 90% 96%
DNN 92% 4% 67% 85%
The results indicate that k-NN has a significant level of
difference with DNN and SVM over both training and testing
datasets. Therefore, a reliable conclusion can be drawn that
k-NN perform the best to detect and classify NCC by a
considerable margin.
Our work is limited in different ways. First, the dataset of
the study was restricted to some selected NCC tools. Second,
we obtained the training data from the tools and we believe
that this is a problem for real world applications of machine
learning algorithms. Third, the work was limited to using 3
machine learning algorithms (i.e. SVM, k-NN, DNN)
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth of computer networks has driven forward
the need to acquire security policy that ensure confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information. This has led cyber-
attackers to find ways to break security policy and infiltrate or
exfiltrate information using network covert channel techniques.
Detection mechanisms to detect covert channels are based on
identifying any deviation of nonstandard or abnormal behavior.
In this paper, selected ML methods were applied to detect
popular network covert channels. The capacity of not only
detecting, but classifying covert channels with high precision
is also demonstrated. A dataset was created from eleven
standard covert channel tools and the covert channels are
then accordingly classified into patterns and labelled. Half
of the generated dataset is used to train three different ML
algorithms. The remaining half is used to verify the algorithms
precision. The tested ML algorithms are Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) and Deep Neural
Networks (DNN). The k-NN model demonstrated the highest
precision rate at 98% detection of a given covert channel and
with a low false positive rate of 1%. DNN has the highest rate
of FP and SVM has the lowest precision with testing dataset.
The findings of the research results suggest several areas
of future work. Firstly, the possibility of additional covert
channel patterns to be tested through the detection scheme.
Secondly, further investigation with other ML algorithms could
be considered. Most importantly however, research is needed
to study how the discussed classifiers impact legitimate net-
work communications while detecting and classifying covert
channels on a large scale.
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